Section 24 - Renewal Rights, Survivors and Confusion by Rittenhouse, John, Jr.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 37 Issue 6 Article 4 
May 2021 
Section 24 - Renewal Rights, Survivors and Confusion 
John Rittenhouse Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
John Rittenhouse, Jr., Section 24 - Renewal Rights, Survivors and Confusion, 37 Dicta 368 (1960). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1960
SECTION 24-RENEWAL RIGHTS, SURVIVORS
AND CONFUSION
By JOHN RITTENHOUSE, JR.t
This paper was awarded the First Prize of $150 in the 1960 Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition at the University of Denver College of Law
and the Second Prize of $500 in the national copyright writing competition.
It is published through the courtesy of the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of
late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting,
and publishing books without the consent of the authors
and proprietors . . . to their very great detriment, and too
often to the ruin of them and their families; for preventing
such practices for the future, and for the encouragement of
learned men to compose and write useful books, be it en-
acted ... -Act of 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
England in the days of Queen Anne foresaw the burgeoning of
the fields of literary endeavor on a scale not theretofore known to
the world. The advent of a workable, moveable-type printing press
more than two hundred years before had seen to that. No longer
was the onus of dissemination of literary fruits to an eager world
placed upon the hunched shoulders and bleary eyes of monks labor-
ing within the grey walls of a monastary. It is most unlikely, how-
ever, that good Queen Anne and her charges could have envisioned
the mass media for the propagation of the Arts as we know them
today.
The impact of the "terrible trio" of the entertainment field-
the sightless but not soundless purveyor of audio Arts, Radio; the
celluloid gobbling marvel, Movies; and that one-eyed, all-seeing
Cyclops, Television-upon an awed twentieth century literary elite
has been radical. The greedy maws of the terrible trio constantly
place ever-widening demands upon hapless authors and composers.
The result, aside from a wide variety of works ranging from trash
to classic, has been the placement of an additional burden upon the
virtues and the vices of the provisions of our prevailing copyright
laws.
The sole source of congressional power to legislate in a protec-
tive way for the betterment of authors and composers derives from
that section of the United States Constitution allowing the legisla-
tive branch of the national government ". . . to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, ..."1 From that slim reed stem our
present day copyright statutes.
The major purpose of this paper will be to point out the short-
comings of current copyright laws of the United States in the area
tMr. Rittenhouse is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, the full text of which is: "The Congress shall have power . . . to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive right to their Writings and Discoveries."
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of survivorship and renewal rights. In this all-important sector of
the Copyright Act,2 one section is primarily controlling.
3
The evolution of Section 24 of the present act has been a long
and tortuous one dating back to the original Copyright Act of 1790.1
The first major revision of the copyright statutes of interest in the
field of renewal rights came in the year 1831. ", The addition of spe-
cific survivorship rights to the author's widow and children, if they
had remained alive beyond his life span, as stated in the report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
... was 'chiefly to enlarge the period for the enjoyment of
copy-right, and there-by to place the authors in this coun-
try more nearly upon an equality with authors in other
countries.... In the United States, by existing laws, a copy-
right is secured to the author, in the first instance, for four-
teen years; and if, at the end of that period, he be living,
then for fourteen years more; but if he be not then living,
the copy-right is determined, although by the very event of
the death of the author, his family stand in more need of
the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them.'
Register of Debates, vol. 7, appendix CXIX.6
This tangible manifestation of legislative intent stands as one of the
few guideposts of substance by which we may trace a course through
the shoals and murky waters of an insubstantial segment of the law.
Before making an attempt to gain an insight on the judicial in-
terpretations levied upon this section of copyright law, it may be
well to pause and assay the reasons for the relative paucity of re-
2 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 1 (1958).
3 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 24 (1958). Duration; renewal and extension. "The copyright secured
by this title shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication, whether the copy-
right bears the author's true name or is published anonymously or under an assumed name: Provided,
That in the case of any posthumous work or of any periodical. cyclopedia, or other composite work
upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted
by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the original author) or by on employer
for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal
and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years when applica-
tion for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered
therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright: And provided further,
That in the case of any copyrighted work, including a contribution by on individual author to a period-
ical or to a cyclopedic or other composite work, the author of such work, if still living, or the widow,
widower or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or
children be not living, the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be
entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight
years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office
and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright:
And provided further, That in default of the registration of such application for renewal and extension,
the copyright in any work shall be determined at the expiration of twenty-eight years from first
publication."
4 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 124, provided for a term of 14 years from date of record-
ing title of work to be copyrighted in the clerk's office of the district court. A renewal for a period of
14 years was secured by this act to the author or authors living at the expiration of the first term or
their executors, administrators, or assigns.
5 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436, the original term for which the copyright was secured
was extended to 28 years. Terms of renewal remained at 14 years. The privilege of renewal under the
Act was granted to the author, or if dead, then to his widow or children.
6 Fisher Music Co. v. Witmork & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943). The Court said: [T]he Copyright
Act of 1831 merely enlarged the benefits of the copyright; it extended the length of the original term
and gave the author's widow and children that which theretofore they did not possess, namely, the
right of renewal to which the author would have been entitled if he had survived the original term.
The petitioners attach much significance to a sentence appearing in the report of the committee: 'The
question is, whether the author or the bookseller should receive the reward.' The meaning of this
sentence, read in its context, is quite clear. By providing that, if the author should not survive the
original term, his renewal interest should, instead of falling into the public domain, pass to his widow
and children, Congress was of course preferring the author to the bookseller. But neither expressly nor
impliedly did the Act of 1831 impose any restraints upon the right of the author himself to assign his
contingent interest in the renewal. That the Act contained no such limitation was accepted without
question by both the courts . . . and by the commentators . . . . Representative Ellsworth, who sub-
mitted the committee report on the bill that became the Copyrigh Act of 1831, himself stated un-
equivocally that an agreement to assign the renewal was binding upon the author.
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corded early opinions. Prior to the advent of the terrible trio, there
were few instances in which a work, be it musical composition or
literary endeavor, had the requisite durability necessitating protec-
tion beyond the original term. Then as now, the public taste for
such "popular works" was exceedingly fickle. As a result, sufficient
pecuniary reasons for litigation were generally lacking.
The dawn of the twentieth century saw abrupt reversal of this
calm and the courts found themselves assailed with cases bearing
upon renewal and survivorship matters. The hapless judges found
themselves ill-equipped in a statutory sense to deal with a problem
that was primarily statutory in nature. Few cases of record were
present for them to apply the revered doctrine of stare decisis. In
such circumstances all that could logically be hoped for was a liberal
application of the doctrine of common sense on the part of the
courts. Whether such hope was in fact fulfilled is a matter for con-
jecture.
The first major case for consideration in this field of copyright
was that of Wheaton v. Peters.7 Henry Wheaton was the author of
twelve books of reported cases argued before the Supreme Court of
the United States. He had sold his rights in the volumes to a pub-
lisher. Upon the expiration of the first term of copyright, a trans-
feree of the rights of the original publisher, acting as agent for the
author, renewed the copyright. In so doing, he failed to deposit the
required copies with the Library of Congress.
After expiration of the first term, the defendants published a
series of court reports in which Wheaton's first volume appeared
verbatim. The lower court dismissed the action upon defendant's
contention that there had been no infringment since there had not
been complete compliance with the renewal requirements. In up-
holding the lower court, the Court rejected the plaintiff's assertion
that even if there had not been proper compliance with the statutes,
there still existed a common law copyright. The Court indicated
that,
From the authorities cited in the opinion of the court, and
others referred to, the law appears to be well settled in Eng-
land that, since the Statute of 8 Anne, the literary property
of an author in his works can only be asserted under the
statute....
That an author at common law has a property in his man-
uscript, and may obtain redress against anyone who de-
prives him of it, or by obtaining a copy endeavors to realize
a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted but this is a
very different right from that which asserts a perpetual
and exclusive property in the future publication of the
work, after the author shall have published it to the world.
That a man is entitled to the fruits of his own labor must
be admitted; but he can enjoy them only, except by statu-
tory provision, under the rules of property which regulate
society, and which define the rights of things in general."
It will thus be seen at the outset, that the Court recognized that the
granting of protection in the form of a limited monopoly (in time)
7 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), rev'd., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 725 (1834).
8 Id. at 591 (Emphasis added).
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was an artificial concession and therefore not to be granted any aid
without the four corners of applicable statutes. This basic premise
will be seen to pervade the thinking of the courts today.
Such an attitude on the part of the courts stems, in large meas-
ure, from the old common law concept that anything which was
such a product of mental labors was incorporeal in nature and in-
capable of possessing any right inherent in the ownership of tangi-
ble property. This thought persists even today in that our current
copyright cases deem an idea per se as not capable of copyright.9
A consideration of the last link in the basic statutory chain of
copyright legislation to date bearing upon renewal rights is now in
order. The pressures of the vague and insubstantial financial posi-
tion in which authors were placed eventually came to be known to
persons in positions of authority in the national government. Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt, in his message to Congress in 1905, indi-
cated:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are im-
perfect in definition, confused and inconsistent in expres-
sion; they omit provision for many articles which, under
modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection;
they impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which
are not essential to the fair protection of the public; they
are difficult for the courts to interpret and impossible for
the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the
public. Attempts to improve them by amendment have
been frequent, no less than 12 acts for the'purpose have
been passed since the Revised Statutes. To perfect them by
further amendment seems impracticable. A complete revi-
sion of them is essential .... 10
The House Committee Report which accompanied the House
Bill number 28192 (later to be known as the Copyright Act of 1909)
to the Congress in February 1909, indicated that the legislators had
been thinking in terms of lengthening and strengthening the hold
which an author and the natural objects of his bounty could exert
upon the fruits of his labors." The committee also manifested an
intention to create a new procession of persons, in addition to the
author, who could succeed to the renewal rights if the author had
9 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
10 H.Doc. 1, 59th Cong., 1st Sets., pp. LII (1905).
11 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 14-15 (1909), "Section 23 deals with the term of
the copyright. Under existing law the copyright term is twenty-eight years, with the right of renewal
by the out or, or by the author's widow or children if he be dead, for a further term of fourteen years.
The Act of 1790 provided for an original term of fourteen years, with the right of renewal for fourteen
years. The Act of 1831 extended the term to its present length. It was urged before the committee that
it would be better to have a single term without any right of renewal, and a term of life and fifty
years was suggested. Your committee, after full consideration, decided that it was distinctly to the
advantage of the author to preserve the renewal period. It not infrequently happens that the author
sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a
great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be
the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is the
existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.
The present term of twenty.eight years, with the right of renewal for fourteen years, in many
cases is insufficient. The terms, taken together, ought to be long enough to give the author the
exclusive right to his work for such a period that there would be no probability of its being taken
away from him in his old age when, perhaps, he needs it most. A very small percentage of the copy-
rights ore ever renewed. All use of them ceases in most cases long before the expiration of twenty-
eight years. In the comparatively few cases where the work survives the original term the author
ought to be given on adequate renewal term In the exceptional case of a brilliant work of literature,
art, or musical composition it continues to have value for a long period, but this value is dependent
upon the merit of the composition. Just in proportion as the composition is meritorious and deserving
will it continue to be profitable, provided the copyright is extended so long; and it is believed that
in all such cases where the merit is very high this term is certainly not too long."
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died.1 2  The committee not only formulated the groups to accede to
the privilege but additionally ranked them in descending order of
priority. To this latter provision and its wording, we owe many of
the current cases in the field of copyright litigation.
With the adoption of this extensive revision of the copyright
law of the United States in 1909, we reach the point where we must
turn away from the formulation of the statutes themselves. A
scrutiny of the application given these words by the various courts
of the United States follows.
Basically, our copyright law remains the same structure today
as that adopted in 1909. True, here and there a word or phrase has
been deleted.'1  The Copyright Act has been codified.14  Nonethe-
less, the structure and philosophy of the act remain intact. This
may serve to strengthen the validity of a survey of the cases arising
thereunder from the act's adoption to the present.
There have been attempts in Congress over the course of the
intervening years to interpose another general revision of the copy-
right statutes.'; Up to the present day, they have come to naught;
the act remains essentially intact.
II. AUTHORS, NATURAL AND UNNATURAL OBJECTS OF THEIR BOUNTY
The privileges of copyright are completely statutory in nature
and thus only those persons other than the author as enumerated
by the statute are entitled to the renewal term of a copyright."
Early cases took the view that any prior assignment of renewal
12 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 14-15 (1909), "Your committee do not favor and
the bill does not provide for any extension of the original term of twenty-eight years, but it does
provide for an extension of the renewal term from fourteen years to twenty-eight years; and it makes
some change in existing law as to those who may apply for the renewal. Instead of confining the
right to renew to the author, if still living, or to the widow or children of the author, if he be dead,
we provide that the author of such work, if still living, may apply for the renewal, or the widow,
widower, or children of such author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower,
at, children be not living, then to the author's executors, or, in absence of a will, his next of kin.
Itiwas not the intention to permit the administrator to apply for the renewal, but to permit the author
who had no wife or children to bequeath by will the right to apply for the renewal."
13 Copyright Act of 1909, § 23. the words "when such contribution has been separately registered".
which appeared in the second proviso after the words "composite work", were deleted by Copyright
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 51.
14 Made into positive low by the Copyright Act of 1947, ch. 391 § 1, 61 Stat. 652, which provided
in part that, "Title 17 of the United States Code entitled 'Copyrights' is codified and enacted into
positive law and may be cited as 'Title 17, U.S.C. §
15 Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents (General Revision of the Copyright Low), 72nd
Cong., 1st Sess., (1932) 547 pps.; Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents on H.R. 10976 a
Bill to Amend and Consolidate the Acts respecting Copyright and to Codify and Amend Common-law
Rights of Authors in their Works, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., (1932) 229 pps.; Hearings Before the House
Committee on Patents for Revision of Copyright Laws, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1936) 1560 pps.
16 Black v. Henry G. Allen Co., 56 Fed. 764 (S.D. N.Y. Cir. 1893); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v.
Gaff, 187 Fed. 247 (1st Cir. 1911); Southern Music Pub. Co. v. Bibo-Lang, 10 F. Supp. 975, (S.D. N.Y.
1935); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 27 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
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rights on the part, of the author was of purely contractual flavor
and should be upheld as against any of the enumerated survivors
of the author.17 More recent cases have completely abandoned such
a view, unless the author himself be in fact alive at the commence-
ment of the renewal period. 8
Should the author survive until the commencement of the re-
newal period, a prior valid assignment of his renewal expectancy
can serve to compel him to take out a renewal application. Fur-
ther, a trust will be impressed upon him to hold such renewal right
to the benefit of the assignee.'
In speaking' further on the validity of assignments of renewal
rights by authors, the Court through the medium of the Witmark
case said:
As stated in the report of the House Committee, this bill
'differs in many respects from any of the bills previously
introduced.' Your committee believes that in all its essen-
tial features it fairly meets and solves the difficult problems
with which the committee had to deal.
The report cannot be tortured, by reading it without re-
gard to the circumstances in which it was written, into an
expression of a legislative purpose to nullify agreements by
authors to assign their renewal interests. If Congress,
speaking through its responsible members, had any inten-
tion of altering what theretofore had not been questioned,
namely, that there were no statutory restraints upon the
assignment by authors or their renewal rights, it is almost
certain that such purpose would have been manifested ...
We agree with the court below, therefore, that neither
the language nor the history of the Copyright Act of 1909,
lend support to the conclusion that the 'existing law' prior
to 1909, under which authors were free to assign their re-
newal rights if they were so disposed, was intended to be
altered .... 20
It seems clear that the Court will tolerate no attempt to hedge
legally where a properly constituted agreement to assign the re-
newal right exists and the author remains alive when the expect-
ancy ripens into reality.
2 1
An examination of the status of a renewal right assignment by
the author when death intervenes reveals differing results. Since
17 Paige v. Banks, 13 U.S. (13 Wall.) 608 (1871). A court reporter contracted with a publisher to
supply him with said reports and publisher was to have "copyright of said reports to them and their
heirs and assigns forever." The Court indicated that the agreement was intended contractually to pass
all the interest of the author in the work and therefore the publisher had become absolute owner, to
the derogation of the author or his survivors.
IS Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 274 F. 731 (E.D. N.Y. 1921), off'd., 279 Fed. 1018 (2d Cir. 1922),
rev'd. 261 U.S. 326 (1923); Southern Music Pub. Co. v. Bibo-Lang, 10 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. N.Y. 1935);
G. Ricordi & Co. v Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 42d Cir. 1951).
19 M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. N.Y. 1941), off'd., 125 F.2d
949 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd., Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). In 318 U.S. 643,
649, the Court said, "We conclude, therefore, that the Copyright Act of 1909 does not nullify agree-
ments by authors to assign their interests. We are fortified in this conclusion by reference to the actuaf
practices of authors and publishers with respect to assignments of renewals, as disclosed by the records
of the Copyright Office....
"The available evidence indicates, therefore, that renewal interests of authors have been regarded
as assignable both before and after the Copyright Act of 1909. To hold at this late date that, as a
matter of low, such interests are not assignable would be to subiect all relevant aids to construction.'"
20 Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 648 (1943).
21 Witmark & Sons v. Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 950 (1942). There the court said, in upholding
the lower court decision, "It is to be conceded by all concerned that this creates only an expectancy,
and that in any event the author must be alive on the first day of the twenty-eighth year in order to.
obtain a renewal. An assignment of this expectancy must rest also an survival."
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the major aim of that provision of the act dealing with survivor-
ship is to protect the author and those dependent upon him for a
means of support, the statute will exclude the enforcement of a re-
newal assignment executed in futuro by the author where the
death of the author has interposed. 22 The basic reasoning behind
this result as effectuated by the statute is evidenced by the report
which accompanied the Act of 1909 to the floor of the House.23 It is
probable that the thinking of the legislators was not as black as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter characterized the contentions of a defense
counsel when he said, "The policy of the copyright law, we are told,
is to protect the author-if need be, from himself-and a construc-
tion under which the author is powerless to assign his renewal in-
terest furthers this policy. We are asked to recognize that authors
are congenitally irresponsible. ' '24 The fact remains that society
places great emphasis upon a finished product of literary or musical
composition with little regard for the well-being of the author either
before or after the masterpiece is consumated. Possibly this view
is fostered by the popular though fallacious picture of a starving
and disease-ridden composer emerging from his stuffy garret with
his masterpiece in hand. Only from the hands of such a man, so the
myth continues, can come true inspiration and art. It is submitted
that this is far from the concept likely to "Promote the Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts."
The scheme of statutory renewal right represents a marked de-
parture from the well-settled common law theories of descent and
distribution. In truth, the term "renewal right" is a misnomer since
the courts have construed this right to be a new power and not
stemming from and attached to the original copyright term.25 The
renewal then, does in fact, constitute a new thing of value quite
separate from the original registration and available only to the
named individuals or classes set forth within the confines of the
statutory provisions.
26
The law sets out the following order in which the enumerated
persons or classes may gain the right to renewal application and
possession of the renewal term when issued thereunder:
1. The author;
2. The widow, widower, or children (if the author is dead);
3. The author's executor (if none of the persons named in
subsection 2 survive);
4. If the author died intestate and is not survived by per-
son or persons in subsection 2, then to next of kin.
2 7
Within these four enumerated categories lie the seeds of innumer-
able litigations. These provisions have been damned for their gen-
22 Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951); Carmichael v. Mills Music,
121 F. Supp. 43 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
23 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
24 Whitmork and Sons v. Fisher Music Co., 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).
25 Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 188, (S.D. N.Y. 1957); off'd., 265 F.2d
925 (2d Cir. 1959); cert. gr., 361 U.S. 809 (1959); aff'd., 80 Sup. Ct. 792 (1960); Witmark & Sons v.
Fisher Music Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. N.Y. 1941), aff'd., 125 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1942); aff'd., Fisher
Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S 643 (1943); Silverman v Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909,
(1921).
26 Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F.
Supp. 314, 315 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) "... and that the plaintiff made application for renewal within one
year before the initial term expired. This being the case, it is clear that the plaintiff acquired a new
and independent right in the copyright, free and clear of any rights, interest, or licenses attached to
the copyright for the initial term."
27 Copyright Act, 17 U.5C., § 24 (1958).
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erality, for their lack of specifically defined inter-relationships be-
tween the categories, and for their ability to confuse the wary and
unwary alike. Yet they remain the tools of the trade. The only way
to ascertain the extent of their efficacy has been to try them in a
court of law. To the cases then we must turn in an attempted move-
ment to glean the full significance of the statutes.
III. THE DEATH OF AN AUTHOR
Presuming the demise of an author or composer prior to the
commencement of the twenty-eighth year of the original copyright
term, it seems clear by both the legislative intent and the exact
words of the statute that the "Widow, widower, or children" sur-
viving will be entitled to the first right to renew.
One question arising under this first segment of Section 24 was
whether the word "or" was meant in a disjunctive or conjunctive
sense. Does a widow take in preference to any surviving children?
Addressing itself to this important question in the 1956 case of De-
Sylva v. Ballentine,8 the Court through Mr. Justice Harlan said,
Two questions are involved: (1) do the widow and chil-
dren take as a class, or in order of enumeration, and (2) if
they take as a class, does 'children' include an illegitimate
child? Strangely enough, these questions have never be-
fore been decided, although the statutory provision in-
volved have been part of the Act in their present form since
1870.29
In examining the first proposition, the Court indicated that the
words "Widow, widower, or children" were unintentional substi-
tutes of the word "or" for the word "and" between the time of the
1831 Act and the 1870 revision. The Court said,
There is no legislative history, either when the 1870 Act
was passed or in the subsequent sessions of Congress, to in-
dicate that Congress in fact intended to change in this re-
spect the existing scheme of distribution of the renewal
rights. Rather, what scant material there is indicates that
no substantial changes in the act were intended. It would
not seem unlikely that the framers of the 1870 statute, in-
terested in compressing the somewhat cumbersome phras-
ing of the prior Copyright Act, simply deleted the words
'and child' with the thought that the remaining phrase 'or
children' expressed precisely the same result, leaving un-
affected the rights of the author's children which had been
the same for almost forty years.30
It would, therefore, seem settled under the present act that the
widow and children are to take renewal rights as a class.
What do the courts hold to be a "child" within the meaning of
the act? Holding that the brand of illegitimacy would only serve as
a bar upon application of state law, the Court indicated that there
28 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956).
29 Id. at 572.
30 Id. at 576.
S10S-LAWLOR" CORPORIITIOn SRLS- ALPIIE 5-3422
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is no law of domestic relations on a federal level.31 Reference to the
law of the forum state is therefore in order.
How long does a widow continue to retain her status as such?
The only case of record to date passing upon this question has in-
dicated that within the four corners of the copyright statute, the
woman will continue in this status indefinitely, subsequent mar-
riages notwithstanding. 32 Whether a widower would likewise re-
main so classified upon remarriage is subject to conjecture.
Presupposing the non-survivorship of the widow, widower, or
children, what is the position of the executor named in a will? May
he exert his powers under the statute to preclude a contractual ob-
ligation made by the author? In Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles3 3 the
Court faced this problem squarely. The question: presented there
was whether the author of a set of copyrighted poems, who:had as-
signed all of his interest including authority to renew to a pub-
lishing house, could, by will at the time of his decease, transfer to
his executor or legatee under the will the capacity to obtain the re-
newal right under the statute in derogation of his contract.
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice Holmes, indicated an affirmative answer to the question. The
Court specifically said, in regard to the status of the executor, that,
[W] e see no sufficient reason for thus limiting the right
of the executor. The section read as a whole would express
to the ordinary reader a general intent to secure the con-
tinuance of the copyright after the author's death, and none
the less so if the actual continuance was effected by creat-
ing a new estate, or if the beneficiaries in certain cases are
pointed out. No one doubts that if Carleton had died leav-
ing a widow she could have applied as the executor did, and
executors are mentioned alongside of the widow with no
suggestion in the statute that when executors are the prop-
er persons, if anyone, to make the claim, they cannot make
it whenever a widow might have made it. The next of kin
come after the executors. Surely they again have the same
rights as the widow would have had. The limitation is de-
rived from a theory that the statute cannot have intended
the executor to take unless he took what the testator al-
ready had. We should not have derived that notion from
the section, which seems to us to have the broad intent we
expressed .
34
In placing the executor on a par with the other classes designated
31 DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956), the Court said, "We come then, to the question
.of whether an illegitimate child is included within the term 'children' as used in section 24.
"The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its
content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal low. . . .This is especially true where a
:statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is
primarily a matter of state concern. . . To decide who is the widow or widower of a deceased
author, or who are his executors or next of kin, requires a reference to the low of the State which
created those legal relationships. The word 'children' although it to some extent describes a purely
physical relationship, also describes a legal status not unlike the others. To determine whether a childhas been legally adopted, fdr example, requires a reference to state law. We think it proper therefore,
to draw on the readymade body 
of state law to define the word 
'children' n section 24."
32 Marks Music Carp. v. Borst Music Pub. C0 ., 110 P. Supp. 913 (D.C. N.J. 1953), at 917, "Defendants
contend further that as Davis' wife remarried she lost her widow's rights to a renewal copyright.
No such restriction is expressed or implied in the wordin of the Act nor does any recorded case underthe A t lend support the theory. Authority to the efect that a woman who remarries 
retains her
:status as widow of her first husband abounds in analogous branches of law ..... "
33 261 U.S. 326 (1923).34 Id. at page 329.
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in the statute, the Court has cleared up a question hitherto unan-
swered, possibly at the cost of raising a strong doubt in the mind of
any publisher seeking to retain control over a work of literary en-
deavor or a musical composition.
The most recent case in which the Court undertook to review
the position held by an executor in relation to an assignee-publisher
came in April, 1960.35 Involving litigation over the renewal rights
to a well-known song titled, innocuously enough, "Moonlight and
Roses", the case is possessed of an intriguing fact situation meriting
discussion. The gist of it is as follows.
The Miller Corporation had gained control of the original copy-
right term through a predecesor firm. The original copyright was
gained in January of 1925. In 1946, Ben Black, who, in collabora-
tion with Charles N. Daniels, had written the words and music, as-
signed his partial interest in a copyright renewal to the plaintiff
Miller. Later that year, plaintiff, seeking to protect himself from
any rights of survivors, obtained separate assignments from the
three brothers of Black of any respective interests which they might
have in the renewal term. In 1950, Ben Black died before the com-
mencement of the last year of the original term. He left no wife
nor children. He did, however, die testate, naming his brother Da-
vid as executor. The residuary estate was left to Black's nieces and
nephews.
In 1952, during the last year of the original term, the executor
applied for and was granted a renewal. The California Superior
Court issued a decree ordering distribution of the estate proceeds.
The nieces and nephews took the song rights and assigned them to
Charles Daniels, the co-author.
In affirming the decisions of the lower courts granting to the
executor the right to renewal privileges, Mr. Justice Douglas speak-
ing for a slim majority of the Court said,
We fail to see the difference in this statutory scheme be-
tween widows, widowers, children, or next of kin on the
one hand and executors on the other .... True, these are
disparate interests. Yet Congress saw fit to treat them
alike. It seems clear to us, for example, that by the force
of § 24, if Black had died intestate, his next of kin would
take as against the assignee of the renewal right. Congress
in its wisdom expressed a preference for that group against
35 Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 80 Sup. Ct. 792 (1960).
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the world, if the author, the widow, the widower, or children
are not living. By § 24 his executors are placed in the same
preferred position, unless we refashion § 24 to suit other
policy considerations. Of course an executor usually takes
in a representative capacity. He 'represents the person of
his testator' . . . and that normally means that when the
testator has made contracts, the executor takes cum onere.
• ..It is clear that under this Act the executor's right to
renew is independent of the author's rights at the time of
his death. What Congress has done by § 24 is to create con-
tingent renewal rights .... [WI hether it works at times an
injustice is a matter for the Congress, not for us.3 6
The Court has. thus clearly indicated that although injustice
may result, the statute must govern. It would seem that the point
has been reached where the publisher requires some legislative pro-
tection from the operations of such a train of events. Surely the
public good requires the well-being of all facets of the industry, be
they authors, composers, or publishers.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan, accorded to by three of his
fellow justices, showed strong dissatisfaction with the majority's
application of Section 24. Indicating that distinctions should be
drawn in the case of executors, the opinion went on to say,
The important question, then, is to determine the extent
to which Congress has seen fit 'to depart from the ordinary
rules of succession.' In reaching its conclusion, the Court
has, I think, overlooked critical distinctions between differ-
ent clauses of the statute.
.o .I agree that the provision for a 'compulsory bequest'
to the author's widow and children should be held to bar
effective assignment of renewal rights against them.
But I cannot perceive of the applicability of this reason-
ing to the executor .... Surely we cannot infer jegislative
concern over the protection of the interest of whomsoever,
of the large indeterminate class of potential legatees, should
prove in fact to be chosen by the author.
3 7
The dissent concludes by saying, "By undermining the sales value
of renewal rights at the expense of the author and his immediate
family this decision impinges on the very interests which the Copy-
right Act was designed to protect." 3
What of the position of the administrator c.t.a? The legislative
intent of the Congress seemed to have precluded an administrator
from applying for renewal rights. 39 The majority of the reported
cases have taken the position that it matters not whether the ad-
ministrator be d.b.n. or c.t.a.40 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
follow a line of reasoning which would prevent the garnering of
renewal rights under the statute merely because of the death of an
executor, but this is what has happened. The only result is the en-
try into the public domain, at a premature date, of valuable rights
36 Id. at 795-96.
37 Id. at 797.
•38 Id. at 798.
39 Surra at note 11.
40 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247 (1st Cir. 1911); Danks v. Gorden, 272 Fed. 821
(2nd Cir. 1921); Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 804 (2nd Cir. 1923); cert. den. 262 U.S.
758 (1923).
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for the lack of some intermediary figure capable of obtaining the
right for a deserving legatee.
A comparatively recent case 41 shows a possible departure from
this strict application of sanction against any type of administrator.
The fact situation is striking since it involves litigation by a sister
of an author to prevent an administrator c.t.a. from gaining access
to the renewal rights for the author's various books. The named
beneficiary by the terms of the deceased's will was his home town
of Gibran, Lebanon. In upholding the decision of the lower court
that the administrator c.t.a. was capable of gaining the renewal
right for the legatee town, Judge Hand of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals indicated that such adminstrator did, in fact, stand in
the shoes of an unnamed executor for the will. 42 He further indi-
cated that the prior holding of this same circuit court of appeals in
the Sunrise cases43 regarding an administrator c.t.a.d.b.n. was mere-
ly dicta and therefore not binding upon the court.
The view expressed by these courts in the Gibran decision is
likely to be lent added authority in view of the denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court. It would seem then that the position of such
an administrator c.t.a. will henceforth allow him to exercise such
powers with regard to copyright renewals as would be held by an
executor.
According to statute, the author's next of kin are only entitled
to renewal rights in the absence of a will. 44 This being true, little
more than a vague hope accrues to one in this category in the pres-
ence of a will. In the face of the latest decision granting an admin-
istrator c.t.a. the same power of renewal as the executor, it would
appear well near impossible for a next of kin to gain access to the
right when a will-is extant.
Should a will not be in existence and none of the higher ranked
persons named by the statute survive, the door is opened for the
next of kin to apply for renewal. Since he has been termed to be a
member of a class, he holds the right in trust for whatever mem-
bers of the next of kin that may come to the fore at a later date. 45
Under the circumstances, the renewal privilege gained by one of
such status is probably the most uncertain of all. Its pecuniary re-
wards would remain in doubt for a substantial period of time. Any
other members of the group would be fully as capable of assigning
his rights to another publisher.46 Under the circumstances, the
value of such a right might be appreciably diminished.
The status of a proprietor under Section 24 indicates one pos-
sible means that can be adopted by a publisher to cope with possible
interference with his right to continue publication during the re-
newal period. If an author or composer is placed on the proprietor's
payroll, all works accomplished while on such a condition of em-
41 Gibran v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 854, off'd. 255 F.2d 121, cert. den. 358 U.S. 828 (1957).
42 Gibron v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 255 F.2d 121 (1957).
43 Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (2nd Cir. 1921); Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures
Corp., 290 Fed. 804 (2nd Cir. 1923), cert. den. 262 U.S. 758 (1923).
44 Copyright Law 17, U.S.C., § 24 (1958). See. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 25 F. Supp. 361
(S.D. N.Y. 1938), concerning the ability of a next of kin to gain a valid renewal after the dismissal
of the executor. It is to be doubted that this view is any longer valid in the light of the decision
rendered in Gibran v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 358 U.S. 828 (1957).'
45 Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909, cert. den., 262 U.S. 758 (1923); Silverman v.
Sunrise Pictures Corp., 290 Fed. 805, cert. den., 262 U.S. 758 (1923).
46 Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
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ployment will accrue to the copyright control of the employer. Since
in this regard the employer of such an author is denominated the
proprieter of the work, the right to the renewal term as well as the
original term will belong to him.47 For the purposes of this section
of the act, the word "proprietor" may be equated with the word
"author" since all of the rights that we have heretofore identified
with the author will also accrue to a bona fide proprietor in the
author's stead.
Cases illustrative of this principle are not lacking on the rec-
ords.48 The results remain the same whether an artist paints a
mural for a high school under contract to the board of education49
or a song-smith\ turns out tunes for a music publisher on a weekly
retainer. 50
IV. JOINT WORKS, COMPOSITE WORKS- THEIR EFFECT ON RENEWALS
A joint work can best be described as the combined work pro-
duct of two or more persons which, once completed and fitted to-
gether, remains from then on incapable of being identified except
as a unified whole.51 This is in contradistinction to a composite
work, which is merely the conglomeration of several independent
works placed in company with one another merely for the purpose
of a single venture. An example of the latter would be an antho-
logy of western novels.
In the case of a true joint composition, it matters not that the
collaborators were unaware of the other's activities at the time of
the work, had never had personal meetings with their co-worker, or
indeed, were at all aware of his existence.52 Here, mere intention
of the parties governs and if a musical composer had intended that
someone supply his composition with words, a joint work will ensue
upon the application of the words to music,54 The ramifications of
a joint work in the field of renewal copyright privileges is more
widespread than the simplicity with which they may be formed
would tend to indicate.
The troubles start with the onset of the renewal period, espe-
cially if one or more of the joint owners has died in the meantime.
Rival publishing companies find themselves ranged on the opposite
sides of a courtroom, one possessing what he thought to be an ef-
fective assignment from the surviving author while the opposing
publisher pins his hopes upon the assignment of the widow or child
of the deceased co-author. From such chaos only dissatisfaction can
ensue regardless of what solution the court indicates.54 If two valid
renewals are deemed to have been made, one of the lyrics and the
other of the music, during the renewal period we have the anomal-
47 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 24 (1958).
48 Von Tilzer v. Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191, off'd. Cumm v. Vogel Music Co.. 158 F.2d 516
(2d Cir. 1944); Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 36 F. Supp. 544, aff'd. 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941).
49 Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 25 F. Supp. 361, aff'd. 108 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1939). The lower
court said, at page 364, "When a man, hereinafter referred to as a patron, contracts with an artist
to paint a picture for him, of whatever nature it may be, the contract is essentially a service contract,
and when the picture has been painted and delivered to the patron and paid for by him, the artist
has no right whatever left in it."
50 Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57, cert. den., 305 U.S. 650 (1939).
51 Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
52 Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
53 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, cert. den., 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
54 Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 80 Sup. Ct. 792 (1960); Norden v. Oliver Ditson
Co., 13 F. Suop. 415 (D.C. Mass. 1936); Maurel v. Smith, 220 Fed. 195 (S.D. N.Y. 1915), aff'd.,
271 Fed. 211 (Id Cir. 1921).
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ous result of an indivisible work that has been strangulated by di-
vision. Clearly, a result unhappy in its effect.
The major source of confusion in regard to composite works is
in the area of the extent of protection granted to the individual
component parts. The section of the act dealing with such works
indicates that, "The copyright provided by this title shall protect all
copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, and all
matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without
extending the duration or scope of such copyright. '55 It is to be
noted that in dealing with the copyright of composite works the
thing sought to be protected is not the individual compositions in
themselves, but rather the format. Keeping such an approach in
mind, it seems only logical that the compiler of the collection should
apply for renewal rights in his own name as "author" as well as
making application for the original term. Such is indeed the case.56
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
What conclusions may we draw from the cases considered? It
would be simple enough to say that the statutory provisions of the
present Copyright Act need radical revision. The confusion sown
by the vague framing of Section 24 is evident from the cases enum-
erated. The most recent cases reported indicate that future litiga-
tion in this field of renewal rights and survivors' benefits will only
be limited by the fertile minds of copyright attorneys.
Indeed, copyright law in the United States is confronted with an
anomalous situation. The basic premise is that copyright law in the
United States is primarily and fundamentally a creature of statute.
The long lines of litigants moving constantly through our crowded
court seeking clarification by adjudication is no tribute to the fram-
ers of present day laws of copyright.
The entire purpose for the creation and maintenance of this
form of limited monopoly called copyright is ostensibly to foster
the public good by giving added incentive to would-be creators of
such works. If this purpose is to be adequately fulfilled, a firm
foundation for future reliance must be laid down in the form of con-
trolling statutes. That such statutory certainty does not exist today
55 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 3 (1958).
56 Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 1 F. Supp. 713, (D.C. Ga. 1932).
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is evident from a survey of the cases. Hence the first conclusion is
that we must replace our present provisions of the Copyright Act
dealing with renewal rights and survivors' benefits.
Since the field of copyright control is completely statutory in
concept and form, logic would indicate that this artificial animal
must be nutured and cared for from within the bosom of a statutory
system dealing in specifics. When and under what circumstances
may an author assign his renewal rights? When do such rights cease
to be an expectancy and become a vested interest? When does the
renewal right vest in the enumerated classes of preferred individ-
uals? These are but some of the flood of questions that should have
been answered by the statutes but ended in the courts due to the
yawning imperfections of the statutory provisions. Therefore our
second conclusion is that any replacement statute must be drawn
with particularity and addressed specifically to the problems likely
to be encountered.
Must the United State's concept of renewal rights be preserved
in any future statutes or is it preferable to adopt some scheme of
copyright protection more nearly in line with those of the majority
of other nations in- the world? The proclaimed purpose of such re-
newal rights provisions has been two-fold: firstly, to protect the au-
thor from his own improvident business affairs; secondly, to pro-
tect his family at the time of his demise. It may well be asked if we
cannot protect effectively these enumerated classes of individuals
in another and simpler way. That other nations of the world utilize
such systems is evident from an examination of the world copyright
scene. Hence, the third conclusion is that we must abandon our
present scheme of renewal rights and substitute a simpler and more
workable device. In attempting to formulate such a device, this
country should strive to find a replacement which will more nearly
conform to our own concepts of descent and distribution and move
more to the direction of the prevailing theories of world copyright
protection.
How shall we accomplish such a radical departure from the old
and, in this country, established pattern of copyright renewals, inef-
fectual assignments of renewal expectancies and supposedly vested
renewal rights? Let us venture forth and attempt to rough out the
possible form of a replacement statutory provision for Section 24.
I. The duration of the copyright term is declared to be deter-
mined by the length of the author's life plus a span of fifty
years from the date of his death.
II. Should the author die possessed of his copyright, it shall de-
volve in the following manner:
A-to the author's widow or widower and children then
living,
B-upon the death of all persons of Class "A", prior to or
simultaneous with the author's death, then the profits
derived from such copyright to the objects of the au-
thor's bounty as determined by the provisions of the
author's will, if there be a will in existence. If there be
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no will, the profits shall accrue to those persons de-
termined by the local laws governing descent and dis-
tribution.
C-Executors and administrators are to deal with the copy-
right for the benefit of those persons or things as de-
termined to be in class "B".
III. Any person or group may purchase complete copyrights from
the author during his lifetime and thereby attain full and
lasting control thereof, PROVIDED THAT,
A-during the author's lifetime periodic arbitration may be
had upon demand of the author at the end of each five
year term dating from the execution of the original as-
signment of rights by the author. (Note-details of such
arbitration are left out for the purpose of clarity of ex-
position.)
B-the right to such arbitration may not be waived except
by a writing executed by the author during the fifth
year of each arbitration period in question.
IV. Upon the death of an author, his successors in interest shall
have the same right to make full, complete and lasting as-
signment of copyright privilieges EXCEPT that only mem-
bers of Class "A" shall be privileged to invoke the provisions
for periodic arbitration as to questions of readjustment of pay-
ments.
V. All joint ownership is hereby abolished in copyright matters.
In its stead, the joint collaborators shall designate one of their
number to be holder of the legal copyright. Such a holder
shall be deemed to hold said right in trust for his collabora-
tors. Upon such holder's decease or mental incapacity, the
rights shall devolve to another member of the original group.
The proportionate share of the deceased's equitable interest
shall be dispensed in accordance with section II.
This skelatal form of a proposed replacement statute is far
from flawless but it does serve to illustrate the fundamental thesis
of this paper. Since the entire field of copyright law is statutory
and artificial, let us make the most of it. Instead of finding our-
selves chained to an obsolete piece of artificiality, let us cast it out
and find a new scheme more in line with current thinking in the
world. If we can make these copyright provisions work for the pub-
lic good once more instead of simply contributing to the public con-
fusion, we shall have recaptured our congressionally fabricated
beast and placed him to laboring for the positive advancement of
the Arts.
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